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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ESTHER B. KING, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
LAWRENCE M. KING, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
12056 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Defendant, appellant, husband, seeks reduction 
or termination of alimony obligation. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant's motion for reduction or termina-
tion of alimony obligation was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the order of the 
court dated March 20, 1970, denying modification 
of the Decree. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Even though respondent admits, except as here-
in stated, the facts set forth by appellant in his brief, 
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respondent recites other additional facts which re-
&pondent believes to be pertinent: 
The court, in the decree of divorce dated October 
13, 1965, made the following Findngs of Fact: 
"Plaintiff is under a doctor's care for a 
nervous condition and is unable, at the present 
time, to secure or hold employment and that it 
is reasonable and proper that defendant pay 
alimony to plaintiff for her support and care 
in the amount of $250.00 per month, provided 
that upon payment in full of the present mort-
gage and encumbrance against the real prop-
erty as described herein, or upon the sale 
thereof, prior to said final payment, said sup-
port payment shall be reduced to the sum of 
$200.00 per month." R-13, P9. 
In the order of the court, dated March 20, 1970, 
from which the appellant appeals, the court made 
the following Findings: 
"1. That the parties were granted an in-
terlocutory decree of divorce on October 13, 
1965, and that the plaintiff was awarded the 
sum of $250.00 per month as alimony. Thatat 
the time of said divorce the plaintiff was un-
der a doctor's care. That the defendant was 
present in court and entered his appearance 
and waived service. 
"2. That the plaintiff is suffering from 
back problems after a spinal fusion operation 
on March 31, 1968, rendering plaintiff unable 
to bend or stoop to do things; further, her back 
con di ti on has rendered her unable to secure 
employment or hold employment. The plain-
2 
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tiff has been seeing Dr. Diumenti and Dr. 
Hess, in connection with her physical and ner-
vous condition. 
"3. That the plaintiff's economic condition 
has not altered since the original divorce case. 
"4. Defendant is remarried to a woman 
with four children and is and has been em-
ployed by Kennecott Copper for twenty-three 
years, and his present salary is substantially 
the same. That the defendant is in debt due tO' 
the remarriage, cost in living, and taxes." R-
62, and 63. 
From the fore going Findings, the court con-
cluded that the defendant had failed to establish a 
substantial change of circumstances to warrant a 
modification of the original divorce decree. R-63. 
The appellant's statement on page 4 of his brief 
to the following effect: "The award of alimony was 
apparently entered on the premise that the plaintiff 
was unemployable due to a nervous condition which 
caused her hospitalization and psychiatric treatment 
... ", is not supported by the record, the court having 
specifically found in the Findings of Fact and the 
Decree of Divorce, "that it is reasonable and proper 
that defendant pay alimony to plaintiff for her sup-
port and care in the amount of $250.00 per month, 
... " R-13. 
Introduced at the hearing was defendant's ex-
hibit I containing a statement from Dr. W. E. Hess, 
elated June 17, 1969, R-61. Said medical report states 
"she was also given explicit instructions as to how to 
3 
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~ift and how to bend and to avoid heavy lifting. She 
was told to try and get by with what she had. She 
was explicitly told how to lift and bend so that she 
·would avoid injuring her spine at a higher level. X-
rays on that occasion showed a solid fusion from L-5 
to the sacrum." 
" .... she was advised to be careful with heavy 
lifting. She was to squat to lift all objects and was 
told that if she persisted with heavy lifting she might 
wear out the next disc above .... " 
". . . . if one were to rate her as to permanent 
impairment, her permanent partial impairment as 
loss of body function would be approximately ten 
percent." 
Respondent was seen by Dr. Hess on September 
2, 1968, and March 24, 1969. See exhibit 1, R-61. 
Edna L. Dastrup, a tenant of the respondent, 
testified upon examination by appellant's attorney, 
that she had seen respondent do housework, both be-
fore and after her spinal fusion of March of 1968, 
and that she had heard her complain about her back 
.;;ubsequent to the spinal fusion. R-60 pages 15-16. 
The court should be aware, also, that Mrs. Dast-
rup, at the time of her examination in court was in-
volved in a lawsuit with the respondent in which 
she was suing the respondent for certain sums which 
she claimed were owed by respondent to her. This re-
sulted from an·angements made at the time Mrs. 
4 
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Dastrup moved into the apartment of 1ilrs. King. R-
60 pages 20 and 21. Mrs. Dastrup also testified on 
cross-examination that after respondent was oper-
ated on that she wore a corset. However, she was not 
aware of how long she wore it; that she just knew 
that she wore it. R-60 p. 23 
Mr. Lawrence M. King, the appellant, was 
sworn and testified as follows: Appellant testified 
that he did not contest the original decree of divorce. 
R-60 p. 25. Appellant testified that his earnings for 
the year 1965 from the Kennecott Copper Corpora-
tion were in the sum of $8,217 .68. Further, appellant, 
had testified that his salary at present from Kenne-
cott Copper amounted to the sum of $8,712.00 a year, 
or a gross of $726.00 per month. Appellant further 
testified that there was not much difference between 
his take home pay between the present time and the 
time of the entry of the decree of divorce. R-60 p. 27. 
Appellant, also, on cross examination, testified as 
follows: 
"Question: Mr. King, I take it from your 
testimony, that this alimony is unduly oppres-
sive has nothing to do with the remarriage in 
the rearing of now four children. Is that a 
fair statement? 
, 
"Answer: Well, certainly remarriage has 
something to do with it, but is still oppressive. 
It would be hard to get along if I was single. 
"Question: But you could have probably 
handled the situation had you lived alone and 
not remarried. Isn't that a fair statement. 
5 
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"Answer: I might a got by, yes. 
"Question: Now at the time, of course, 
that you were remarried, you were aware that 
you had the alimony payments? 
''Answer: Yes." R-60 p. 35. 
Appellant also testified that his new wife re-
ceives $150.00 per month from her ex-husband, as 
support money and that one of her children receives 
social security of approximately $115.00 per month. 
R-60 P. 37 
Further, appellant testified that if his new 
wife's ex-husband paid the $150.00 per month in full, 
plus the social security of $115.00 per month, that he 
would have a net spendable income of $765.00 less 
the $250.00 he pays to respondent, leaving a balance 
of $485.00 to support himself, his new wife and the 
four children. R-60 P. 37-38 
Further, appellant admitted that he had never 
attempted to file for a modification of his alimony 
payment until after he had remarried. Further, that 
he had been advised that the mere fact that he had 
remarried was not a substantial change in circum-
stances to warrant a reduction in alimony. Further, 
appellant admitted that he had been advised that the 
first obligation was to his first family or to his first 
wife. Appellant, in response to this question stated 
"well that's their opinion." R-60 p. 38. 
Further, appellant admitted that he had not 
spoken with the respondent in the past year, so that 
6 
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his observation of her returning to normal would 
have to be limited to not including the last year prior 
to the hearing. R-60 P. 39 Appellant further ad-
mitted that he knew nothing of the respondent's 
physical condition as of the present time of his own 
personal observation, and that he did not know of 
his own personal observation whether or not the 
respondent was capable of doing waitress work, or 
heavy lifting. R-60 P. 39 
Orlo Dastrup, the son of Edna Dastrup, testi-
fied that he lived with his mother in the respondent's 
home in Bountiful from around Christmas of 1968 
until the last of February, 1969. That during said 
period of time he had seen the respondent shovel 
snow in the driveway a couple of times. R-60 p. 41 
The respondent, Mrs. Esther B. King, was sworn 
and testified as follows: That she was 57 years old; 
that on March 1, 1968 she had a back fusion on her 
spine; that she had seen Dr. Hess the day before her 
appearance in court. R-60 p. 48. Respondent further 
testified that she had trouble with her back; that it 
was hard for her to bend over to pick up things and 
that she had to wear a corset for over eight months 
after the operation; that she had had no employment 
since her back operation, although she had made ef-
forts to locate employment and had put her applica-
tion in in several places. R-60 p. 50. She testified 
that she had been to St. Mark's Hospital to apply as 
a nurse's aid. However, when they found out that 
she had back trouble, they turned her down for that 
7 
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employment. Also, she had made application for 
waitress work, but had been unsuccessful in obtain-
ing any. R-60 p. 50 Respondent further testified 
that she had other illnesses besides her back. That 
she had pneumonia twice; that she was on welfare 
in 1967, when the appellant was on strike, and that 
she had been forced to borrow money in order to live. 
She further testified that she had worked at the Mis-
sion Cafe prior to her operation for about two 
months; that she had contracted pneumonia and was 
laid off. That Dr. Diumenti had asked her to go to 
the hospital; that she advised him that she could not 
as she had no medical and hospital insurance. R-60 
p.51 
Respondent further testified that she had a job 
at Z.C.M.I. warehouse in November of 1967. That 
she had quit the job because she had a lot of trouble 
with her back and sciatic pain That after seeing Dr. 
Hess she quit her job at the warehouse. R-60 p. 52 
Respondent further testified that she had seen Dr. 
Diumenti as an all around physician; that she was 
extremely nervous and that he had given her medica-
tion for her nerves at different times. R-60 p. 53 Re-
spondent also testified that she had been to see a Dr. 
Henrie at the Salt Lake Clinic, a psychiatrist. R-60 
p. 53. Respondent also testified that her income con-
sisted of $70.00 from the rental of the basement 
apartment, but from that she has to pay Mrs. Das-
trup $50.00, and $20.00 to her brother for tile install-
ed on the basement floors so that she receives no in-
8 
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come after said expenses from th~ apartment rental. 
Respondent further testified that she did not have 
any other income other than the $250.00 that the ap-
pellant was ordered to pay to her as alimony. R-60 p. 
54 Respondent testified that with respect to her gen-
eral health that she was still extremely nervous, R-60 
p. 54, and that she does not feel good. That with re-
spect to her back, that if she does not stand straight 
or sit erect that she has what they call "Spines" in be-
tween the vertabras, which is an arthritis of the 
spine. R-60 p. 55. Respondent testified that at the 
time of the decree of divorce that she was in the hos-
pital because of her nerves and had to leave the hos-
pital to appear in court; that this was due to the con-
duct on the part of the appellant, Mr. King. R-60 p. 
55. Respondent further testified that in the event she 
could find full time employment, that at such time 
the court could look at the matter for possible reduc-
tion of the alimony payment. R-60 p. 57 Mrs. King, 
the respondent, further testified that because of the 
strike, when Mr. King was unable to pay her, that she 
had to borrow money and that she was still trying to 
pay it off. R-60 PP. 58-59. Mrs. King, the respond-
ent, further testified that when she went hunting pine 
nuts that she did not climb trees; that the few pine 
nuts she obtained she picked up and put in a gunny 
sack. R-61. She further stated that she had never 
told Mrs. Dastrup that she had climbed up into trees. 
R-60 P.61. Respondent admitted having shoveled 
snow, but that she had worn a brace while she was 
doing so; that there was no one else to do it. The re-
9 
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spondent also testified that she had picked a few 
grapes in September; that she had gotten along in her 
job and never been fired. R-60 P. 63. Respondent ad-
mitted that there were a lot of things that she did 
not enjoy about her physical activity, but being by 
herself she was forced to do some of them. R-60 P. 63 
Respondent further testified, on cross-examination 
by appellant's attorney, that she was hospitalized for 
her nerves at the time of the decree of divorce and 
that the break up of the marriage was very painful 
to her. R-60 P. 66. Respondent further testified that 
the jobs that she had held since the entry of the de-
cree of divorce she terminated because she had be-
come ill. R-60 pages 66-67. 
Respondent further testified that the welfare 
paid for the operation on her back and the x-rays be-
fore surgery, but after the surgery that she had paid 
the bills. R-60 P. 68 She was on welfare during the 
the period of time the appellant was on strike. R-60 
P. 68. 
Carol Cote was sworn as a witness and testified 
on behalf of the respondent as follows: She was ac-
quainted with the respondent Mrs. King and had 
known her for approximately eight years and that 
she had had occasion to visit with the respondent af-
ter her operation. R-60 p. 69-70. She testified that 
she had seen the respondent attempt to shovel snow 
and that respondent was under very much stress in 
doing so and that she had advised her not to do it. 
10 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
R-60 p. 70. She also testified that she had seen the 
respondent during the time she had worked at the 
Mission Cafe as a waitress; that the respondent had 
become ill and had pneumonia, that she had tried to 
go back to work again, and again contracted pneu-
monia. R-69 p. 71. Mrs. Cote further testified that 
the respondent had been highly emotional since the 
entry of the decree of divorce and that she would 
stay with her for hours on end to try and get her 
over these periods of despondency. R-60 p. 72. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ENTERING ITS DECISION 
OF MARCH 20, 1970. 
Appellant's argument in point I is based entirely on 
a misconception of the trial court's position in a prior 
proceeding. Here, apparently, the appellant is refer-
ring to a prior hearing in which the parties attempted 
by stipulation to amend the decree of divorce, but 
were unable to agree, and subsequently were under 
the impression that the court was going to make an 
order based on a stipulation that the parties never 
agreed to. The court at page 2, R-68, stated; "The 
Court : This court could only base its order on your 
stipulation because the court did indicate to counsel 
that it would make no finding of a change of circum-
stances on the part of either party that would justify 
change in the alimony judgment." 
Further, the court stated: "The Court: Mr. 
King, I believe I proposed a stipulation or such other 
11 
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stipulation as you might agree to. In the absence of 
any - of either stipulation, the court is now pre-
pared to rule on the original motion to modify the 
decree." 
In view of the fact that the parties could not 
agree on the subject matter of the stipulation the 
court could certainly not force a stipulation upon the 
parties but could only rule and enter an order such 
as the court saw fit. Accordingly the only order from 
which the appellant can now appeal from is the order 
of March 20, 1970. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFEND-
ANT RELIEF ON ALIMONY BECAUSE THERE WERE NO 
SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFY-
ING SUCH RELIEF. 
It is well settled by this court that for a decree 
of divorce to be amended in the manner suggested 
by the appellant, that the appellant must prove that 
that there has been a substantial change in circum-
stances since the entering of the decree which would 
entitle him to such an amendment. Appellant states 
that there are two basic changes of circumstances: 
1. The defendant had been unable to work his 
way out of debt because his wife got everything in 
the divorce decree and he got the debts. In this re-
gard, it should be remembered that the appellant 
stipulated in open court and was present at the time 
the decree of divorce was entered. Ile had agreed 
to the division of property that was made. Ilis own 
12 
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testimony was to the effect that he would have been 
able to have survived had he not remarried. 
Further, appellant also testified that he made 
no effort at modification until such time as he had 
remarried. The fact of his remarriage can be given 
no weight where the appellant was well aware of 
his obligation to his first marriage and accepted this 
at the time he did remarry. 
2. The second major error which the appellant 
attempted to assert to the trial court was that respon-
ent's circumstances had changed. It is true that 
the respondent, at the time of the decree of divorce 
was emotionally upset, depressed and despondent 
because of what the appellant had done, but certainly 
this is not the only basis upon which the court grants 
alimony and not the only basis upon which the 
court granted support for the respondent in the par-
ticular case. The court found, in the original decree 
of divorce, that it was only reasonable that the ap-
pellant pay to the respondent support money at the 
rate of $250.00 per month until such time as the 
home was paid for. Such a finding and decree is 
entirely reasonable under the circumstances. Since 
the decree of divorce the respondent had a spinal back 
fusion, had pneumonia twice, had several Ii ttle jobs, 
none of which had been entirely successful because of 
her health conditions. The respondent found it neces-
sary to obtain welfare during the period of time that 
the appellant was on strike and was unable to pay her. 
All of which, of course, support the trial court's find-
13 
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ing in the original decree of divorce, that it was only 
reasonable that the appellant should pay to the re-
spondent support money at the rate of $250.00 per 
month. The situation has not changed at present. 
The fact remains that the respondent is unable 
to support herself and after a marriage of some six-
teen years and at the age of 57, the respondent is 
still in need of that support. 
The appellant has not shown a change of cir- i 
cumstances and as such is not entitled to the relief 
he requests. See 30-3-5 UCA 1953 as amended, 
Chaffee v. Chaffee, 63 U. 261, 225 P. 76; Rockwood 
v. Rockwood, 65 U. 261, 236 P. 457; Osmus v. Osmus, 
114 U. 216, 198 P2d 233; Dixon v. Dixori, 121 U. 
259, 340 P2d 1211. 
It is apparent from the voluminous record that 
has been presented to this court that the trial court 
has made an extremely diligent effort to accomodate 
both parties in hearing the evidence and examining 
the exhibits and the record that has been presented 
to it. Certainly, under such circumstances the find-
ings of the trial court should not be overruled and 
great weight should be given to them. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McCullough and McCullough 
Attorney for plaintif !-respondent 
304 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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